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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(48 C.2d 1; S06 P.2d 89'7)

[L. A. No. 24012. In Bank. Feb. 15, 1957.]

WINSTON N. SALSBERY et a!., Appellants, v. TEX
RITTER et a1., Respondents.
{L. A. No. 24013.

In Bank.

Feb. 15, 1957.]

WINSTON W. SALSBERY et a!., Appellants, v. TEX
RITTER et at, Defendants; EUGENE W. BISCAILUZ,
as SherUi, etc., et a1., Respondents.
'
[1] Judgments -

Declaratory Judgments - Plea.ding.-Generally,
when a complaint for declaratory relief shows the existence of I
an actual controversy among the parties a general demurrer,
should be overruled, and plaintiff is entitled to a declaration
of his rights whether or not the declaration is favorable to·
him.
[2] Id.-Declaratory Judgments-When Remedy May Be Invoked.
-Although the remedy against a sheriff for failure to issue a
certificate of redemption to either plaintiffs or their subsequent
judgment creditors might nppropriately be a petition for mandate, an action for declaratory relief is not inappr,opriate

[1} See Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 32 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Declaratory Judgments, § 63 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 12; [2] Judgments,
§9(3); [3,18J Executions, §83; [4,5) Process, §8; [6) Executions, § 76; [7) Executions, § 76; Homesteads, § 63; [8, 13-16] Executions, § 79; [9] Exerlltions, §§ 75, 79 (2); [10, 12] Executions,
§79(2); (l1J Ban~tqJtcy, § 9; [17] Executions, § 79(1).
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where a controversy with respect to redemptions revolves
around the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 703, requiring recordation of notice of redemption.
[3] Executions-Redemption-Actions-Pleading.-As against a
general demurrer, a complaint for declaration of rights based
on a sheriff's failure to issue a certificate of redemption to
either plaintiffs or their subsequent judgment creditors may
be construed as an application for mandate.
[4] Process-Issuance of Summons-Alias Summons.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 406, providing for issuance of only one original summons for each county in which one of the defendants resides,
and § 408, providing that an alias lIummonll may issue when
the original has been returned or lost, contemplate that there
is to be outstanding in a single county only one summons at a
time.
[6] ld. - Issuance of Summons - Alias SummoDB.-Service of a
second alias summons without the return of the first alias summons or an affidavit that the first had been lost does not
warrant annulment of a default judgment when the attack
eomes in an independent suit in equity more than a year after
entry of the judgment and plaintiffs do not allege that they
had a meritorious defense to the original action.
[Sa, 6b] Executions-Redemption-Who May Redeem-Oreditors
of Judgment Debtor.-Judgment creditors who obtained a
judgment against the debtor subsequent to an execution sale
of the debtor's realty under a different judgment are entitled
to redeem such realty since, on recordation of their judgment,
it became a lien on the interest the debtor retained.
[7] ld.-Redemption: Homesteads - Antecedent Liens and Liabilities.-The fact that a judgment debtor against whom creditors obtained a judgment subsequent to an execution sale of
realty under a different judgment homesteaded the property
before the junior creditors' redemption did not render the
redemption invalid as a forced sale of exempt property, since
under Civ. Code, § 1241, the homestead was subject to sale in '
satisfaction of a judgment that constituted a lien on the
premises before the declaration of homestead was filed.
[8] ld.-Redemption - Procedure - Redemption From PreviOus
Redemptioner.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 703, declaring that
if property sold at an execution sale be redeemed by a redemptioner, "another redemptioner may, within sixty days
after the last redemption, again redeem it from the last redemptioner on paying the sum paid on such last redemption,

[4] See CaLJur.· Process, Notices and Papers, § 9; Am.Jur.,
Process, § 9.
,-/
[6] See OaL.fur.id, Executions, 1206; Am..Jur. ExeeutioDII,
t 862 eh8CJ.
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• • . and, in addition, the amount of any liens held by such
redemptioner prior to his own with interest," the statutory
words "such redemptioner" refer to the words "last redemptioner," which refer not to the current redemptioner but to the
prior redemptioner, and as thus interpreted the latter part of
the quotation would read "and, in addition, the amount of
any lien held by the prior redemptioner prior to his own . • .";
and "liens . . . prior to his own" means liens prior to the lien
on which the current redemptioner seeks to redeem.
[9] ld.-Redemption-Purpose and Construction of Statute.-One
primary purpose of statutory redemption is to force the purchaser at an execution sale to bid the property in at a priee
approximating its fair value, and to effectuate such purpose
the statute must be construed to encourage redemption and
make the property answer for existing liens up to its value;
redemption would not be encouraged by a construction that
would permit a subsequent lienor to re-redeem without paying
to the prior redemptioner the amount of his judgment.
no ld. - Redemption - Procedure - Pa)'ment - Amount.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 702, providing that on redemption from
the execution purchaser the redemptioner must pay the purchase price and certain other items "and if the purchaser be
also a creditor, having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner,
other than the judgment under which said purchase was made,
the amount of such lien with interest," the liens "that must be
paid are those prior to that on which the current redemptioner
seeks to redeem, and the rule mnst be the same on redemption
from a prior redemptioner.
[11] Bankruptcy-meet of Filing Petition.-Mere filing of petitions in bankruptcy do not serve to discharge a judgment.
[12] Executions-Redemption-Procedure to Obtain-PaymentAmount.-Where a judgment obtained by judgment creditors
subsequent to an execution sale of the debtor's realty under
a different judgment was recorded before the debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy, the judgment lien was unaffected by
the bankruptcy proceedings, and a discharge of the judgment
in bankruptcy would not reduce the amount required for ~
demption, since Code eiv. Proc., § 703, relating to the measure
of payment due a prior redemptioner, requires payment of
liens, not judgments.
[18] ld. - Redemption - Notice of Redemption - Recordation.Code Civ. Proc., § 703, refers to two distinct notices, a notice
of redemption and a notice of subsequent expenditures or
after-acquired liens, and the requirement that a notice of redemption be filed _with the county recorder is applicable
Whether or not the:'redemptioner, subsequent to his redemption,
makes expenditures for- items enumerated in the section or
acquires another lien.

I
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[14] Id. - Redemption - Notice of Subsequent Expenditures or
After·acquired Liens.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 703, relating
to notices of redemption and of subsequent expenditures or
after-acquired liens and specifically providing that "if such
notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such tax, assessment, sum or lien," the reference to "tax,
assessment, sum, or lien" indicates that the specified penalty
pertains only to failure to record a notice of subsequent expenditures or after-acquired liens, not to failure to record a
notice of redemption.
[15] Id. - Redemption - Notice of Redemption - Recordation.Reasons underlying the statutory requirement that a notice of
redemption be recorded (Code Civ. Proc., § 703) are that such
notice diminishes the possibility that a subsequent redemptioner will make payment to some person who because of an
undisclosed intervening redemption no longer has any interest
in the property, and that persons eligible to re-redeem are entitled to know the amount of money required to effect a
redemption so that they may act intelligently with respect
to the property, and notice of redemption gives notice of the
amount of lien on which a prior redemption was made.
[16] Id.-Redemption-Notice of Redemption-Effect of Failure
to Record.-The effect of a failure to record the notice of redemption required by Code Civ. Proc., § 703, depends on events
following the omission; if no person sought to re-redeem within
the statutory period, the failure to record would have no effect,
but if a subsequent redemptioner should, without notice, pay
the wrong person, the good-faith redemption would be effective
as against the faulty one.
[17] Id.-Redemption-Procedure to Obtain-Payment-Tender.When a person eligible to redeem property sold at an execution sale, without notice of any intervening redemption, tenders
to the sheriff or the last redemptioner of record a sum of
money which but for the lien of the undisclosed redemptioner
would be sufficient to effect a redemption, the tender is sufficient, and the intervening redemptioner who failed to record
is precluded from demanding as a prerequisite to redemption
from him the amount of his lien unless the person seeking to
redeem is notified of the pertinent facts by the sheriff or the
last redemptioner of record.
[18] Id. - Redemption - Actions - Pleading. - In an action for
declaratory relief based on a sheriff's failure to issue a certificate of redemption, plaintiffs, whose property was sold on
execution, must show that they had no actual notice of a prior
redemption w)lcn they tendered a sum of money which but
for the lien of the undisclosed redemptioner would be sufficient
to effect a redemption, before they will be entitled to a favorable declaration, but without an allegation pleading such fact

)
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the complaint is sufficient where it states a ease for a declaration of the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 703, requiring
recordation of notice of redemption.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Bayard Rhone, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action for declaratory and other relief. Judgments of dismissal affirmed as to defendants Municipal Court of the Los
Angeles Judicial District and its clerk; reversed as to other
defendants.
Edward H. Blixt for Appellants.
Stanley Sevilla, in pro. per., Kenneth D. Holland, Harold
W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and William E.

Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 20, 1955, plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint consisting of three counts in which they
sought (1) a declaration of rights, (2) a determination of
conflicting claims to realty, and (3) the nullification of a
judgment and an execution sale of realty pursuant thereto.
On June 29, defendants Biscailuz, sheriff of Los Angeles
County; the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial
District; and Barbour, clerk of the municipal court, filed a
demurrer attacking each count of the amended complaint as
insufficient to state a cause of action. The court sustained
the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment
of dismissal for those defendants.
On September 19, after plaintiffs had filed a fourth amended
complaint, defendants Ritter and Holland filed a demurrer,
and a separate demurrer was filed by defendants Custom
Craft, Cutright, Nishemine, and Sevilla. Each of these demurrers was upon the ground that the fourth amended com~
plaint failed to state a cause of action. Both demurrers were
sustained without leave to amend, and judgment of dismissal
was also entered for those defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
'1.'he ultimate issue on appeal is whether or not the facts
alleged by plaintiffs show a right to relief. The fourth
amended complaint is identical to the amended complaint
insofar as defendjUi1.s Barbour, Biscailuz, and the municipal
court are concerned, and since the count for declaratory

)
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relief contains substantially all of the allegations found in
the other counts, only that count will be discussed.
In substance these are the facts alleged: Defendant Custom
Craft obtained a judgment against plaintiffs, Winston and
Helen Salsbery, for $150.09 and costs. In the action an
original summons was issued and returned. An alias summons was issued, and without the return of the first alias
summons or an affidavit that it had been lost, a second alias
summons was issued by the Clerk. While the first alias summons was still outstanding, service of the second alias summons
was made upon Helen, and judgment was entered by default. 1
Pursuant to the Custom Craft judgment a writ of execution issued and was levied upon the interests of plaintiffs
in certain described realty. On May 4, 1954, the sheriff sold
plaintiffs' interests to defendants Cutright, Nishemine, and
Sevilla for $51.70 and issued and recorded a certificate of sale.
On June 14, 1954, defendants Ritter and Holland obtained
a judgment against plaintiffs for $1,500, 2 which was recorded
June 25, 1954.
On April 21, 1955, plaintiffs homesteaded their interest
in the realty.
On April 28, 1955, defendants Ritter and Holland purported to redeem the property by paying to the sheriff $51.70
plus interest and costs. Ritter and Holland did not record
a notice of redemption as required by section 703 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
On April 29, 1955, plaintiffs served upon the sheriff a
notice of redemption, filed a copy of the notice with the
county recorder, and deposited with the sheriff $61.80, which
is still on deposit with him. The sheriff, Ritter, and Holland
have demanded that plaintiffs deposit with the sheriff an
additional sum equal to the amount of the judgment in favor
of Ritter and Holland, plus interest and costs. The sheriff
refuses to issue a certificate of redemption to either plaintiffs
or Ritter and Holland on the ground that he does not know
who is legally entitled to the certificate.
On June 1, 1955, plaintiffs filed " .•• two petitions in
bankruptcy • • . discharging all of the aforementioned judgments and indebtedness."
'The faet that the ;judgment was taken by default is not alleged in
the eomplaint but is i1selosed by plaintiffs' petition. This defieienc1
eould have been eureO: b1 amendment.
'Holland is Bitter's attorney, and he vigorously diselaims &Dy pel"llonal
,utereat in this judgment. This point, however, is not properll railed
.,. • ...-.l t.aurrer to tile complaint,

Feb. 1957]
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[1] In an action for declaratory relief, when the complaint shows the existence of an actual controversy among
the parties, a general demurrer to the complaint should be
oY('rruled. The plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of his
rights whether the declaration is favorable to him or not.
(Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. ([; Loan Soc., 23 Ca1.2d 719, 728
et seq. [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062].) Two exceptions
to this general rule have been recognized (Bennett v. Hibernia
Bank, 47 Ca1.2d 540, 549-550 [305 P.2d 20]), but neither
exception is involved in this case.
It is readily apparent that the complaint shows the existence of an actual controversy between plaintiffs and defendants Custom Craft, Cutright, Nishemine, and Sevilla
with respect to the validity of the Custom Craft judgment
and the subsequent execution sale. Likewise, a controversy
is shown to exist between plaintiffs and defendants Ritter
and Holland with respect to rights arising from the two
purported redemptions. [2] Although the remedy against the
sheriff might appropriately be a petition for mandate (see
Lawler v. Gleason, 130 Ca1.App.2d 390 [279 P.2d 70]), an
action for declaratory relief is not inappropriate, since the
controversy with respect to the redemptions revolves around
the meaning of section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(see discussion infra). (California Physicians' Service v.
Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.L.R. 306].)
[3] Furthermore, as against a general demurrer the complaint may be construed as an application for mandate. (Boren
v. State Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981].)
It was error therefore to sustain the demurrers, and the
judgments must be reversed. (Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. &
Loan Soc., supra.)
Our decision that controversies are shown to exist, however, does not resolve them, and we must therefore pass upon
the questions of law that must be decided to reach a final.
determination of the case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.)
Validity of the Custom Craft Judgment
Plaintiffs contend that the clerk was without authority
to issue a second alias summons without the return of the
first alias summons or an affidavit that the first had been
lost, that therefore the service upon Helen of the second
alias summons did not subject her to the jurisdiction of the
court, and that consequently the judgment against her and
the subsequent execution sale are void.

8
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This contention was considered by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in reversing a judgment of nonsuit in an unlawful detainer action
brought by Ritter against the Salsberys. (Ritter v. Salsbery,
142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 853-854 [298 P.2d 166].) The
court held that there was no error in serving the second
alias summons, saying, ". . . there is nothing in section 408,
Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits the issuance of
an alias summons while a previously issued alias is outstanding. . . . It ... provides, without further qualification or
condition, that 'As many alias summonses as are necessary
may be issued within such time'. . . . " In our opinion section 408 alone does not provide a solution to the problem.
Although it authorizes the issuance of several alias summonses,
the question remains whether they may be issued concurrently or whether the preceding summons must be returned
or lost before a new summons may issue.
[4] Section 406 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
for the issuance of only one original summons for each
county in which one of the defendants resides. Section 408
provides that an alias may issue only when the original has
been returned or lost. Reading these sections together we
conclude that there is to be outstanding in a single county
only one summons at a time. This conclusion .finds further
support in the fact that at common law it was thought that
the return of the preceding writ was a prerequisite to the
issuance of an alias or pluries writ. (See Alderson on Judicial Writs and Process (1895), pp. 154-157.)
[5] The question then arises whether the irregularity in
process of which plaintiffs complain is a sufficient reason
to annul the subsequent judgment when the attack comes
in an independent suit in equity more than a year after the
entry of judgment and plaintiffs do not allege that they
had a meritorious defense to the original action. The answer
is that it is not. Even at common law failure to return the
preceding writ did not render the alias or pluries writ void.
(Alderson, supra, at 155-156.) In Williams' Administrator
v. Welton's Administrator, 28 Ohio St. 451, under statutes
very similar to our own, it was held that service of a second
alias summons while the first was still outstanding gave the
court jnrisdiction over the person. The court said at page
471: "The object of a summons is to give the party notice,
and as each of these writs was in due form, one was as
effectual, as a notice, as the other to the party served." We

Feb. 1957]
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agree with this statement and hold, therefore, that the Custom
Craft judgment is not void.
The Purported Redemptions
Plaintiffs advance several arguments in support of their
contention that Ritter and Holland never effectively redeemed.
[6a] They urge that since the Ritter-Holland judgment was
not obtained until after the sale of the property on execution, Ritter and Holland acquired no lien and were not
eligible to redeem the property. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 701.)
This contention is without merit. (Clark v. Cuin, 46 Ca1.2d
3S6 [295 P.2d 401] ; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 412413 [70 Am.Dec. 655].) [7] Plaintiffs also contend that
since they homesteaded the property prior to the RitterHolland redemption, the redemption was invalid as a forced
sale of exempt property. (See Civ. Code, § 1240.) This argumeut is likewise without merit, for even were we to hold
that a redemption is equivalent to a forced sale, section 1241
of the Civil Code provides that the homestead is subject to
sale in satisfaction of a judgment that constituted a lien
upon the premises before the declaration of homestead was
filed for record. Such is the fact in this case. The homestead
was not declared until April 21, 1955. [6b] The RitterHolland judgment was recorded June 25, 1954, and under
the rule of Clark v. Cuin, supra, at that time the RitterHolland judgment became a lien upon the interest plaintiffs
retained in the realty.
Plaintiffs urge that even if Ritter and Holland validly
redeemed, the $61.80 deposited by plaintiffs with the sheriff
was sufficient to effect a redemption by the plaintiffs. Section
703 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs redemption from
Ii prior redemptioner. It provides in part: "If the judgment
debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are
required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner.
"8
What payments must a redemptioner make f The section
provides:
"If property be so redeemed by a redemptioner, another
redemptioner may, within sixty days after the last redemptioll, again redeem it from the last redemptioner on paying
the sum paid on such last redemption, . . . and, in addition,
the amount of any liens held by such redemptioner prior to
'Section 701, which lists the classes of persons eligible to redeem,
makes a distinction bepwecn the judgment debtor or his successor and
•• redemptioners."
This distinction is maintained with variable eonsistency throughout sections 702 and 703.

-
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his own with interest; but the judgment under which the
property was sold need not be so paid as a lien."
.Ai! plaintiffs read the statute, "liens . . . prior to his own"
means liens held by the prior redemptioner that are prior
to the lien created by the judgment that the prior redemptioner personally recovered against the debtor, i.e., "his own."
They argue that since only liens prior to "his own" must
be paid, "his own" judgment lien need not be paid. The
contrary argument is, of course, that "liens . . . prior to
his own" means liens prior to that upon which the current
redemptioner seeks to redeem.
Lawler v. Gleason, 130 Cal.App.2d 390, 397-400 [279 P.2d
70], is cited as authority contrary to the construction advanced by plaintiffs. In that case, however, the prior redemptioner held in addition to "his own" judgment lien a
lien "prior to his own," and the ambiguity pointed out here
was not discussed.
[8] It is clear that the statutory words "such redemptioner" refer to the words "last redemptioner" (see original
phraseology, Stats. 1851, ch. 5, p. 88, § 232), and it is equally
clear that the words "last redemptioner" refer not to the
current redemptioner but to the prior redemptioner. As thus
interpreted the pertinent part of the section would read,
" . . . and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by the
prior redemptioner prior to his own. . .. " The juxtaposition of the words "such redemptioner," meaning prior redemptioner, and the phrase "prior to his own" without intervening punctuation would seem to indicate that the phrase
"liens . . . prior to his own" means liens held by the prior
redemptioner that are prior to the lien created by the judgment that the prior redemptioner personally recovered against
the debtor. The purpose for which the statute was apparently
enacted, however, and the language found in section 702 of
the same code, relating to redemption from the execution sale
purchaser, indicate that "liens . . . prior to his own" means
liens prior to the lien upon which the current redemptioner
seeks to redeem.
Chancellor Kent discussed the development of the right to
redeem from sale upon execution in his monumental "Commentaries." (14th ed., vol. 4, pp. 493-515.) He recounts
that at common Jaw, real property was not subject to execution, but that for the brnefit of English creditors, the Statute
of 5 George II, ch. 7 was enacted in 1732, making real estate
in the English colonies subject to execution. For a long
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time it was the practice to sell the real estate absolutely,
without possibility of redemption, but" . . . sales of land on
execution had been attended with so much oppressive speculation upon the necessities of the debtor, . . . " (p. 431) that
sewral states enacted statutes providing for redemption.
[9] It thus appears that one of the primary purposes of
statutory redemption is to force the purchaser at the execution sale to bid the property in at a price approximating its
fair value. (See 23 Mich.L.Rev. 825, 839-841.) This purpose
is apparent in our statute from the provisions in sections
702 and 703 that any deficiency between the purchase price
at the sale and the amount of the lien upon which the property was sold need not be paid upon a subsequent redemption.
To effectuate its purpose the statute must be construed to
encourage redemption and make the property answer for
('xisting liens up to its fair value. Redemption would not be
encouraged by a construction that would permit a subsequent
lienor to re-redeem without paying to the prior redemptioner
the amount of his judgment. Under such a construction the
current redemptioner would take subject to the lien of the
prior redemptioner. The prior redemptioner would then be
entitled to levy execution upon the property, and the process would begin anew. Such a result would be .absurd.
[10] Section 702 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that upon redemption from the execution purchaser, the redemptioner must pay the purchase price and certain other
items" . . . and if the purchaser be also a creditor, having
a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than. the judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of
such lien with interest. . . ." (Italics added.) Here the
meaning is clear. The liens that must be paid are those prior
to that upon which the current redemptioner seeks to redeem,
and the rule must be the same upon redemption from a prior
redemptioner.
Even so, plaintiffs contend that their tender was sufficient.
They point out that while their $61.80 remained in the hands
of the sheriff, the Ritter-Holland judgment was discharged
in bankruptcy. This fact, they argue, made it unnecessary
for them to tender the amount of that judgment. It should
be noted in this respect that plaintiffs' pleading of the asserted discharge is somewhat faulty. [11] The allegation is
that the petitiom; in ,bankruptcy were "filed," "discharging"
the judgment. OlJHously, the mere filing of the petitions
did not serve to discharge the judgment, but the deficiency

12
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could have been corrected by 11IIlfmdment. We have concluded, however, that discharg,. fir the judgment would not
reduce the amount required fOT rmlemption.
[12] Since section 703 rcqu;,.IIH the payment of liens, not
judgments, we are concerned wi fII nle effect upon the RitterHolland lien of the discharge III llIlnkruptcy of the Ritter~
Holland judgment. Section 67[," of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that when Ii jlldl{lOcnt was Ii lien on real
property owned by the bankr1lpt. prior to the time he was
adjudged a bankrupt, the lien FIII/lins unaffected though the
judgment be discharged in bn II II "11 ptcy. The Ritter-Holland
judgment was recorded June 2[" 1!/!,4. Plaintiffs did not file
their petitions in bankruptcy 111" il .June 1, 1955. The RitterHolland lien was therefore ullllffected by the bankruptcy
proceedings.
Plaintiffs' principal argumf'}lt. I1gainst the efficacy of the
Ritter-Holland redemption aml III tmpport of the sufficiency
of their own tender is that RHf .. ,· and Holland did not file
a notice of redemption with th" t~()lmty recorder as required
by section 703 of the Code of Olvil Procedure. The pertinent
part of section 703 reads:
uWritten notice of redemptioll mnst be given to the sheriff
and a duplicate filed with th(' l'(\l:order of the county, and
if any taxes or assessments nl'l\ paid by the redemptioner,
or if any sum for· fire insnrnllt"', maintenance, upkeep, or
repair .. , is paid by the rrllt'lIlptioner, or if he has or
acquires any lien other than 111111 upon which the redemption
was made, notice thereof mUf4f ill like manner be given to
the sheriff and filed with the ]'I,,·tH·tIer; and if such notice be
not filed, the property may bc l'I'tl'~rmed without paying such
tax, assessment, sum, or lien."
[13] In Ritter v. Salsbery, ,wpra, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp.
at 850-852, it was held that 1\ notice need be filed for recordation only if the redeml'f iOller, subsequent to his redemption, makes expenditurc!' for the items enumerated in
the section or acquires anot1wl' lit'll. That interpretation of
the section is erroneous. Se('1 i,'11 703 refers to two distinct
notices, a notice of redempl it1l1 nud a notice of subsequent
expenditures or after-acquiretl lil'lIs. Only the former notice
is involved in this case.
[14] The question then oris.'''; fiR to tIle effect of a redemptioner's failure to file a not it' I' "I' rt'demption with the eounty
recorder. Section 703 proyidt";: " ... if sueh notice be not
filed, the propert~· may be )'I,,\t't'med without paying such
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tax, assessment, sum, or lien." Although a contrary argument
might be made, the reference to "tax, assessment, sum or
lien" indicates that the specified penalty pertains only to a
failure to record a notice of subsequent expenditures or afteracquired liens, not to a failure to record a notice of redemption. Resort must therefore be had to the reasons underlying
the requirement that a notice of redemption be recorded.
[15] One reason may be deduced from the fact that redemption may be effected by paying the requisite amount
either to the officer who sold the property or directly to the
purchaser or prior redemptioner. (Code Civ. Proc., § 704.)
Recordation of a notice of redemption diminishes the possibility that a subsequent redemptioner will make payment
to some person who because of an undisclosed intervening
redemption no longer has any interest in the property.
Another reason is that persons eligible to re-redeem are
entitled to know the amount of money required to effect a
rfdemption so that they may act intelligently with respect
to the property. (See Corporation of America v. Eustace,
217 Cal. 102, 107 [17 P.2d 723]; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 705.) The Legislature has provided that notice of subsequent expenditures and after-acquired liens must be recorded
and, failing that, that their repayment may not be demanded
as a prerequisite to redemption. (Code Civ. Proc., § 703.)
To know the amount required for redemption, however, one
must know not only the amount of subsequent expenditures
but also the amount of the lien upon which the prior redemption was made, since the amount of that lien must be
paid to effect a redemption. The recordation of a notice of
redemption gives notice of the amount of that lien.
[16] The effect of a failure to record would seem to depend upon the events following the omission. For m,.tance,
if no person sought to re-redeem within the statutory period,
the failure to record would have no effect at all. If as a
consequence of the failure to record, a subsequent redemptioner should, without notice, pay the wrong person, the good
faith redemption would be effective as against the faulty one.
[17] When a person eligible to redeem, without notice of
any intervening redemption, tenders to the sheriff or the last
redemptioner of record a sum of money, which but for the
lien of the undisclosed redemptioner would be sufficient to
effect a redemption, that tender is sufficient unless the person
seeking to redeem/is notified of the pertinent facts by the
sheriff or the laSt redemptioner of record, and the inter-
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vening redemptioner who has failed to record is precluded
from demanding as a prerequisite to redemption from him
the amount of his lien. This result gives effect to the purpose
for which recording is required and parallels the result dictated by section 703 when the omission is the failure to record
a notice of subsequent expenditures or after-acquired liens.
In view of the legislatiw ]"rqnirrmrnt that persons eligible
to redeem be informed of the amount of money necessary
to redeem, it is immaterial that the innocent subsequent redemptioner can reclaim his money.
[18J The pleadings in the instant case do not disclose
whether or not plaintiffs had actual notice of the RitterHolland redemption when they tendered their $61.80 to the
sheriff. Of course they must show that they had no such
notice before they will be entitled toa favorable declaration,
and technically they should have pleaded that fact. It appears
from the foregoing discussion, however, that even without
that allegation plaintiffs stated a case for a declaration of
the meaning of the statute.
Since it does not appear from plaintiffs' pleadings that
any controversy exists between plaintiffs and the Municipal
Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District or George J.
Barbour, its clerk, or that plaintiffs are entItled to any relief
against those defendants, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed
as to them. As regards the other defendants, both judgments
of dismissal are reversed for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Plaintiffs shall bear their own costs on
appeal and the costs on appeal of the Municipal Court of
the Los Angeles Judicial District, of George J. Barbour, its
clerk, and of defendants Custom Craft Sheet Metal Products,
Jango Nishemine, George A. Cutright, and Stanley Sevilla.
Each of' the other parties shall bear his own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.
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